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Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory is assumed just to impose a constant
population size. Here we show that resource limitations may generate dynamical payoffs able to alter an
original prisoner’s dilemma, and to allow for the stable coexistence between unconditional cooperators
and defectors in well-mixed populations. This is a consequence of a self-organizing process that turns the
interaction payoff matrix into evolutionary neutral, and represents a resource-based control mechanism
preventing the spread of defectors. To our knowledge, this is the first example of coexistence in well-
mixed populations with a game structure different from a snowdrift game.
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Cooperative behavior is common in nature, and neces-
sary for the evolutionary appearance of higher selective
units—such as eukaryotic cells or multicellular life—from
simpler components [1]. However, the survival of the fittest
under the action of natural selection seems to foster selfish
behavior, taking advantage of other individuals [2,3]. It is
therefore intriguing how cooperative behaviors can emerge
and survive in a world ruled by natural selection. This issue
is frequently addressed in the context of evolutionary game
theory, where the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game [4] has
been used as a paradigm for understanding the evolution of
cooperation, as its simplified noniterated version is the
worst scenario for the survival of cooperation [5]; if inter-
actions between individuals follow a PD and reproductive
success grows with payoffs, cooperative behavior is led to
extinction in large well-mixed populations [5,6]. In the last
decades some mechanisms have been found allowing co-
operative behaviors to survive in the absence of genetic
relatedness, but none of them works for the simplified PD
in the absence of features such as memory [7,8], reputation
gain [9], network structure [10–12], or other sensory inputs
[13,14].
Here we study the influence of resource limitation on the
emergence of cooperation. We find that in addition to
imposing a finite population size, as usually assumed in
evolutionary game theory [4,5,7–15], it may generate dy-
namic payoffs [16–18]. In the absence of resource limita-
tion, the interactions between cooperators and defectors
fulfil a simplified PD, as determined by the selfish strategy,
and thus cooperators extinguish, as expected in evolving
well-mixed populations. Surprisingly, resource limitation
may drive a self-organizing process that allows for stable
coexistence
between cooperators and defectors. In contrast to previous
studies including ecological features, in which coexistence
happens only in public goods games with variable interac-
tion group sizes [19], it is transient [20] or requires spatial
structure [21,22], here we find stable coexistence for
pairwise interactions without population structure. This
stable coexistence resembles the homeostatic equilibrium
in the daisy world [23,24], as both are mediated by
environmental factors driving the system out from
equilibrium.
In order to study this, we develop a model consisting of
an evolving well-mixed population of self-replicating
individuals that receive resources from the environment
and exchange resources during interactions. No population
structure, memory, learning abilities, or any other sensory
inputs are assumed. Each individual i is represented by its
internal amount of resources Ei and its strategy, namely,
cooperate (C) or defect (D). The internal amount of re-
sources may be interpreted as the amount that belongs to it,
independently of why or how. The environment provides
resources in portions Ei0 per unit time to randomly chosen
individuals independently of their strategy, thus, not
modifying the structure of the payoffs. For simplicity, we
impose a constant total resource influx ET , though results
also apply for non constant fluxes (see [25]). If the amount
of resources of an individual exceeds a value Es, it splits
into two identical copies with half its internal amount of
resources.
Defectors are characterized by the maximum amount
of resources associated to an interaction: the cost spent
ðEcÞ for stealing a reward ðErÞ from the coplayer. If
the internal resources of a defector are smaller than the cost
Ec, it does not pay the cost nor receive the reward. If the
interaction partner has resources below the reward,
the entire amount of resources is sequestered. We assume
that these quantities are inherited without mutation; they
represent physiologic,morphologic or genetic characteristics
intrinsic to individuals and cannot be modified by choice.
We consider large populations, simultaneous interac-
tions and Er > Ec > 0, although the same results are ob-
tained if one assumes that every interaction is carried out
by a donor and received by the coplayer [18]. The
interaction matrix determined by the strategies is thus
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and equals a simplified PD, with defectors paying a cost Ec
and obtaining a net rewardE ¼ Er  Ec > 0 (payoffs for
the row player, we will omit C and D in the following
matrices).
Finally, we assume that the limiting resource necessary
for reproduction provides no advantage for keeping alive;
therefore deaths occur at random with a frequency (rate) f
relative to receiving resources and interacting, which hap-
pen equally frequently.
According to the PD structure of resource exchanges
among cooperators and defectors in the absence of resour-
ces limitation, defectors should have a larger resource
intake, reaching faster the splitting bound Es and thus
reproducing quicker (i.e., fitness is proportional to resource
exchanges). Therefore one would expect homogeneous
populations of defectors as the outcome of the evolutionary
process. However, the limitation of resources generates a
distribution of resources among individuals in the popula-
tion. As a consequence, the average reward stolen from
cooperators E0r may decrease below Er, since the internal
resources of some cooperators may fall below this quantity,
thus modifying the payoffs. If the net average benefit of
defectors E0 ¼ E0r  Ec remains negative over all the
time, the payoff matrix does not correspond to a PD any-
more; it is turned into a harmony game and cooperation
becomes the dominant strategy. Simulations show that the
model yields the latter behavior and also, more interest-
ingly, stable coexistence of cooperation and defection
(Fig. 1); see [25] for details on the simulations.
Dominance of cooperation was already found in a previous
model assuming that resources are necessary for keeping
alive [18] which, however, did not provide coexistence.
Coexistence in this scenario requires a complex feed-
back process whose exact analysis is quite difficult because
of the complex nonlinearities involved in the dynamics.
However, a simple quantitative reasoning exhibits the logic
of this feedback and allows for an analytic estimation of
the final stable state of the system. Let us note that an
increase in the number of defectors over the equilibrium
value would cause an overexploitation of cooperators, thus,
reducing their resource content. This would have two
effects: (i) it would reduce cooperators’ reproduction rate
(fitness) because they become farther from the splitting
bound Es, and (ii) it would also decrease the average
reward obtained by defectors, which thereby reduces their
fitness. If the second effect dominates over the first one,
then stable coexistence becomes possible, as the feedback
pushes the system back to equilibrium. A similar argument
applies for a decrease in the number of defectors.
The entire system is in equilibrium when the resource
influxes and outfluxes in the populations of both
cooperators and defectors cancel out. The balance of re-
sources in these subpopulations contains three contribu-
tions: environmental supply, deaths, and interactions. They
are expressed in the following equations
dEC
dt
¼ NC½E0  f EC  pE0rð1 Þ; (2)
dED
dt
¼ ND½E0  f ED  pEc þ pE0r: (3)
Ej, Ej and Nj denote, respectively, the total resource con-
tent, average resources per individual, and number of
individuals of the subpopulations j ¼ C, D; E0 ¼ ET=N
is the mean amount of resources received by an individual
per unit time, with N ¼ NC þ ND the instantaneous popu-
lation size;  ¼ NC=N is the fraction of cooperators; f is
the death probability per individual and interaction, and p
the fraction of the population of defectors able to pay the
cost (i.e., with Ei > Ec).
In equilibrium, the populations of cooperators and de-
fectors become constant in time so that the resource pools
ED and EC reach a constant value. One thus finds the
equilibrium condition
pðE0r  EcÞ ¼ f½ ED  EC: (4)
This shows that the coexistence depends on the death
frequency f. For simplicity, we will assume in this analytic
derivation that deaths happen much less frequently than
interactions, i.e., the limit f ! 0; this corresponds to many
interactions in a lifetime, when the effects of interactions
FIG. 1. Simulation results for the evolution of the fraction of
cooperators  for two different values of the reward Er and cost
Ec associated to the selfish strategy (averaged over 10 runs). In
some cases the simplified PD payoff structure is modified by the
limitation of resources, which allows for coexistence of coop-
eration and defection (solid line) and dominance of cooperation
(dashed line). The final stable states are independent of the initial
 and N. Parameters: f ¼ 1, Es ¼ 1000, ET ¼ 8200000,
Ec ¼ 660; solid line, E ¼ 310; dashed line, E ¼ 10.
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become more relevant. Other f values are studied through
simulations [25]. Since p never equals zero due to the
constant resource influx, Eq. (4) reduces in this limit to
Ec ¼ E0r; (5)
which states that, in equilibrium, the cost paid by defectors
equals the reward stolen from cooperators. In order to
analytically predict the region of coexistence in the pa-
rameters space and the corresponding population compo-
sition, we need to know the average reward E0r in terms of
the parameters Er and Ec. This implies the calculation of
the equilibrium distribution of resources for cooperators,
which is a difficult task due to the nonlinearities involved
in the dynamics. Instead, we can give a rough heuristic
estimate as follows. The lower the fraction of cooperators
in the population, the more frequent any cooperator meets
a defector, thereby cooperators become overexploited and
their average internal resources decrease. Thus, the aver-
age reward E0r is expected to decrease as  decreases. We
assume a linear relationship between both quantities,
E0r ¼ , with  a positive constant. For the moment,
we consider that when  is close to 1, the effect of
defectors is expected to be small, so that at first order, we
approximate the resource distribution of cooperators as
uniform. For uniform distributions [25], one finds E0r ¼
Er  E2r=ð2EsÞ. We thus propose
E0r ¼ 

Er  E
2
r
2Es

: (6)
By combining Eq. (6) with Eq. (5), one obtains an expres-
sion for the equilibrium fraction of cooperators
 ¼ Ec
Er  E2r=2Es
: (7)
In order to analyze in detail the behavior of the model,
we have performed extensive numerical simulations
covering the whole parameters space. They confirm the
stability of the coexistence for all death frequencies, and
show that the final stable state is independent of the initial
conditions and resource influx (and thus, final population
size) [25]. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show a good qualitative
agreement between the predicted  and the outcome of the
simulations. Deviations root in the linear approximation
assumed in Eq. (6) (see [25]).
Let us notice that the obtained stable coexistence be-
tween cooperators and defectors presents a new outcome in
the context of two-player games, where a stable mixed
state is only expected in Snowdrift (or Hawk-Dove) games,
which have a payoff structure different from ours. In
general, symmetric two-player games can be described
through the interaction matrix [26]
0 a
b 0
 
; (8)
where coefficients a and b are assumed to be constant.
Applying the replicator equation [6,15,26] to analyze the
evolution of the population, three cases are possible [see
Fig. 2(c)]: (i) dominance of one strategy (when a and b
differ in sign); this is the case of the noniterated PD, where
defection always wins; (ii) bistability (if both a and b are
negative); in this case the final state is homogeneous and
depends on initial conditions; this is what happens in stag
hunt games, where coordinating with the partner pays; and
(iii) coexistence (if both a and b are positive); this is what
FIG. 2. Final fraction of cooperators  represented in terms of resources cost (Ec) and net benefit (E ¼ Er  Ec) of the selfish
strategy. In black  ¼ 1, in white  ¼ 0. One observes well defined regions of coexistence of cooperation and defection, as well as
regions where cooperation is the dominant strategy. In (a) prediction according to Eq. (7) (see [25] for a highly improved analytical
prediction); in (b) results of agent-based simulations averaged over 50 runs (f ¼ 0:01, Es ¼ 1000, ET ¼ 420 000). In (c) we show the
different games corresponding to a 2 2 matrix; the dashed line shows the places where the payoffs in the model lay [see Eq. (10)].
Point A denotes the final payoffs for coexistence states, where the payoff matrix is evolutionary neutral; points B and C are examples of
final payoffs for situations where cooperation and defection are dominant, respectively.
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occurs in Snowdrift games, when it always pays to play the
opposite of the coplayer.
In our model, fitness is directly proportional to resource
exchanges, because individuals reproduce when their re-
sources overcome an upper bound that is the same for
cooperators and defectors. Resource exchanges come
from the environment and from interactions. The resource
supply from the environment is the same for defectors and
cooperators; it just provides a constant to all fitness values
and can be omitted in the fitness matrix. The latter is thus
ruled by the average resources exchanged through inter-
actions, which aside from a scale factor translating
resource exchanges to fitness, is [18]
0 pE0r
pE0 pEc
 
: (9)
As stated above, p stands for the fraction of defectors
whose resources exceed the cost Ec. Let us note that this
factor does not change the payoff structure in any case, as
it multiplies all payoffs, and it only modifies the time scale
of the dynamics. The interaction matrix can be rewritten in
the form of matrix (8) by adding pEc to the second column
(as adding a constant to a column does not affect the
replicator dynamics [6,26]):
0 pE0
pE0 0
 
; (10)
i.e., a ¼ b ¼ pE0. According to the classification
given above, this payoff matrix leads to dominance of one
strategy whenever pE0  0. In the absence of resource
limitation, E0 ¼ E> 0 and we have a PD. If resources
are limited, there exists a wide range of parameters for
which the E0 is tuned to zero for a specific mixture of
cooperators and defectors [see Figs. 2(a) and 2(b)]; thus, the
stable equilibrium is the result of a dynamical self-
organizing process and not of the game structure itself
[see Fig. 2(c)].
We can use the payoff matrix (10) to gain further insight
into the stability of the coexistence state found in our
model. In Eq. (6) we proposed the rough estimate E0r ¼
 for the net benefit of defectors, with > 0. Thus, we
have E0 ¼  Ec. Aside from a positive factor relat-
ing fitness and payoffs in Eq. (10), the replicator equation
yields
d
dt
¼ ð1 ÞpE ¼ pð1 ÞðEc  Þ; (11)
which supplies three equilibria,  ¼ 0, 1, and Ec=. Since
p > 0, the mixed state is the stable one for 0< Ec= < 1,
in agreement with the stability of the coexistence states
observed in the simulations.
We have presented a scenario which allows for stable
coexistence of unconditional cooperators and defectors in
well-mixed populations under pairwise interactions. This
result is quite robust, since it does not depend on initial
conditions, and it is also observed in small populations—
though in this case fluctuations may lead to the extinction
of one strategy—and under nonconstant influx of resources
[25]. This stable coexistence roots on a self-organizing
process which implicitly includes the environment, and it
is the feedback induced by environmental constraints and
defectors’ behavior which turns the payoff matrix into
evolutionary neutral and allows for the stability of the
system. The evolutionary neutrality of the system
(environmentþ individuals) and its stability as a whole,
might be a first step towards the emergence of new units of
selection by providing a self-organizing mechanism pre-
venting the spread of selfish mutants alternative to central
control (see [1]).
Let us also remark that, in contrast to previous models in
evolutionary dynamics, the model presented here explicitly
sets the issue in a nonequilibrium context, where a (re-
source) flux drives the system out from equilibrium. The
observed self-organized coexistence state may be seen as
another example of the self-organizing processes found in
nonequilibrium systems such as, for instance, the unex-
pected oscillations in Belusov- Zabhotinsky reactions. This
perspective may bear interest in economic contexts, an-
other classical field of evolutionary game theory, where
some authors claim that economic systems should be mod-
eled as open, nonlinear nonequilibrium systems instead of
the closed, equilibrium view dominant in traditional
economics [27,28].
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